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Abstract 
Rural industry provides inputs and markets for agriculture, which in turn provides inputs and 
markets for rural industry. As the mutually supportive linkages between rural industry and 
agriculture develop, the size of both sectors increases. Under certain conditions rural 
industry grows more rapidly than agriculture, resulting in the structural transformation of the 
rural sector. But the growth of rural industry may hurt the state-owned industrial sector if 
both sectors compete for similar resources and product markets. To protect their state 
enterprises, transitional economies have at times suppressed the growth of non-state rural 
industries. This can hurt the economy overall. We show how the growth rates of agriculture 
and rural industry may decline, and, surprisingly, how the growth of state industry might fall 
if rural industry is suppressed. This is especially so if agriculture supports state industry. By 
suppressing rural industry, agriculture is hurt. The decline in agriculture then hurts state 
industry, undermining the objective of protecting state industry. Depending on the magnitude 
of the relevant impacts, intervention to protect state industry may or may not be optimal, 
leaving governments with difficult policy decisions. 
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1   Introduction 
 
In mediating the interactions between agriculture, rural industry and state industry to 
achieve multiple objectives, the Chinese economy has encountered serious 
distortions and structural dislocations.  When the social and economic objective of 
protecting state industry conflicts with the desire for economic growth in rural 
industry, China has shown itself at times willing to intervene in favor of state 
industry.  The result has been an uneven pattern of growth within the rural sector 
since the mid-1980s. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the sectoral interactions that generate such 
tensions and relate them to the structural transformation of China's rural economy.  
We outline the phases of sectoral linkage in an economy undergoing structural 
transformation and develop one-, two- and three-sector models of the Chinese 
economy.  The models include an integrated two-sector development process in 
which rural industry and agriculture support one another to provide positive 
feedback.  In this scenario market linkages transcend competition to establish 
complementary intersectoral growth. 
 
The growth in rural industry can adversely affect state industry, however.  Our three-
sector model highlights the beneficial and competitive interactions between 
agriculture, rural industry and state industry.  Given the prospect of state industry 
succumbing to competitive pressures from rural industry, one response by the 
Chinese leadership has been to protect state industry by restricting rural industry.  
But direct suppression of rural industry may indirectly harm state industry.  This 
stems from the positive interaction between rural industry and agriculture: when rural 
industry declines, so does agriculture.  Since agriculture helps to support state 
industry by providing inputs and establishing market linkages, state industry is 
potentially disadvantaged by the restrictions imposed on rural industry.   
 
The severity of the choice facing the leadership becomes clear: either allow rural 
industry to prosper and compete with state industry, or, in suppressing rural industry 
to release resources for state industry, suffer the adverse economic consequences of 
indirectly harming agriculture (and possibly even state industry itself).  We conclude 
with policy options, including reform of the state industrial sector as an alternative to 
suppressing rural industry. 
 
 
2   Phases of sectoral interaction 
 
Economic development over time involves the interaction of various sectors.  
Sectoral articulation has been studied extensively in the development economics 
literature (eg., Chowdhury and Chowdhury (1993), Ranis and Stewart (1993), 
Anderson (1992), Timmer (1989), Mellor (1986), Ghatak and Ingersent (1984), 
Mellor (1984), Asian Development Bank (1977), Jorgenson (1970), Johnston (1970), 
Ruttan (1970), Hirschman (1958)) and also in the Chinese economy literature (eg., B. 
Lin (1995a), Findlay, Watson and Wu (1994a), Ratha, Singh and Xiao (1994), Islam 
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and Jin (1994), Woo, Hsueh, Shi and Zhang (1993), Zweig (1992), Sicular (1992), 
Wu (1992), Findlay and Watson (1992), Islam (1991), and Byrd and Lin (1990)).  
The novelty of our contribution concerns the application of sectoral linkage theories 
to the structural transformation of the Chinese rural economy, and the way in which 
the maintenance of opposing objectives generates distortions that inhibit the 
structural transformation.  (We use the term structural transformation to mean a 
temporal increase in the ratio of the number of rural industrial firms to agricultural 
firms.  Firms within a given sector are assumed to be identical, and their size is 
assumed to be invariant with time.) 
 
It is useful to distinguish three phases of sectoral linkage between agriculture, rural 
industry and state industry.  Phase I relates to the resource transfers from agriculture 
to the growing sectors.  Agriculture is initially the largest sector in GDP share and is 
required to make a net resource contribution to the growth of emerging sectors.  The 
resource transfers are competitive in the sense that agriculture loses from the growth 
of the other sectors, such as rural industry.  Phase II emphasizes the development of 
sectoral linkages.  Intersectoral competition eventually gives way to positive growth 
linkages between sectors.  This is discussed in a later section, which considers the 
positive feedback between agriculture and rural industry; the two sectors provide 
markets and resources for one another's growth.  In Phase III the sectors grow 
independently of each other.   
 
Phases I and II have been evident in China, although the temporal demarcation 
between them is not clear due to phase overlap.  The rapid flow of labor from 
agriculture to rural industry in the mid-1980s is an example of Phase I.  Phase II 
corresponds to the Central Committee and State Council's March 1984 view of the 
role of rural enterprises in an integrated rural economy, an economy in which 
agricultural and rural industrial growth would be mutually supportive (eg., see 
Findlay and Watson 1992:64).  The transition to Phase II includes greater reliance on 
market forces and a reduction in the bias against agriculture to facilitate its 
development on an equal basis with rural industry. 
 
 
3   The basic models 
   
We now develop models of sectoral growth and interaction, beginning with a one-
sector model.  Consider a sector in which all firms are identical. Let C(q,X) be the 
cost per unit of the firm’s output, q, when the number of firms in the industry is X. 
Let R(q,X) be the revenue per unit of output. Total profit is π(q,X) = (R-C)q.  If 
profits facilitate growth in the number of firms, the average growth rate of X is: 
 
 ),(1 Xq
dt
dX
X
βπ= ,        (1) 
 
where β>0 is a constant. Let: 
 
 ,)(),( 2 XqqXqC φγ +−= ∗         (2) 
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where γ is a positive constant. The term q* represents the output level corresponding 
to the minimum average cost for the firm, with: 
 
 
X
XqC
∂
∂
=
),(φ .        (3) 
 
Assume that firms are competitive.  Each firm takes price, p, as given: R(q,X) = p. 
Since firms produce at minimum average cost, from (1): 
 
 )( XpXq
dt
dX φγ −= ∗ .        (4) 
 
Defining the constants r=q*γp and K=p/φ we have: 
 
XXKrr
dt
dX ))/(( −= .              (5) 
 
Equation (5) represents a simple logistic model describing the growth of a single 
sector, such as agriculture or rural industry, in the absence of interactions with other 
sectors.  Let the sector grow at an intrinsic rate r, which reflects the rate at which the 
sector would grow without the inhibiting effects of resource scarcity.  This rate may 
depend on factors such as the macro- or microeconomic environment and is assumed 
to be constant.   
 
As economic activity consumes available resources, a physical limit to the number of 
firms that may exist and compete in this sector is approached.  Refer to this physical 
limit as the carrying capacity, K (defined as the number of firms that resources may 
support indefinitely).  Defined in this way, the carrying capacity has useful economic 
interpretations: property rights and governance, hard or soft budget constraints, 
operational autonomy and intersectoral competitive pressures, for example, may 
influence the efficiency with which resources are used and determine the carrying 
capacity of a given sector. 
 
Equation (5) models growth as depending on the intrinsic growth rate, r, and on 
intrasectoral competition, ie., the competition for resources between firms in the 
same sector.  The effect of this density-dependent competition is given by the term 
Kr /− .  As the number of incumbent firms, X, approaches the carrying capacity, K, 
the logistic growth rate falls.   
 
As time continues, the number of firms tends to the carrying capacity. From (5) we 
have: 
 
     ii
i
i
ii XXK
r
rX )( −=
•
,      
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⇒ 
dX
X X K
r dti
i i i
i( / )1−
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To integrate the LHS, obtain the partial fractions: 
     1
1
1
1 1
1
1X X K X K K X Ki i i i i i i i( / ) ( / ) ( / )−
=
−
+
−
. 
 
Thus: 
     1 1
X K X
dX r dt
i i i
i i+
−






= ∫∫  
 
⇒ ln lnX K X r t Ci i i i− − = + , where C is a constant of integration. 
 
Setting C c= ln , with c having the same sign as X K Xi i i/ ( )−  yields: 
 
     ln
( )
X
c K X
r ti
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i
−






=  
⇒ 
X
K X
c r ti
i i
i
−
= exp( )  
⇒ X t
K
K X r ti
i
i i i
( )
[ / ( ) ]exp( )
=
− − +0 1 1
, by setting X Xi i= ( )0  for t = 0 . 
 
As t → ∞ , X Ki i→ .  
 
 
Now suppose that another sector exists as well, and that this sector partially 
competes for resources.  The growth of each sector will be inhibited by the 
competitive presence of the other - this is intersectoral competition (or negative 
interaction).  Competition for resources may be either exploitative or interfering.  
Exploitative resource competition occurs when at least two sectors exploit the same 
limiting resources, such as state and rural industry competing for labor.  Interfering 
resource competition refers to actions undertaken by one sector to inhibit another 
sector's ability to survive or exploit resources.  An example is the request by state 
industry for the state to close down rural industries.  Note that in this expository 
section competition is confined to exploitative competition.   
 
A model of competition between the two sectors is given by: 
 
.))/()/((
))/()/((
21212222222
12121111111
XXbKrXKrrX
XXbKrXKrrX
−−=
−−=
•
•
    (6)
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The difference between (5) and the first equation in (6), for example, is the addition 
of the term 21211 )/( XbKr− .  This represents the effect on sector one of competition 
for resources by firms in sector two; ie., the effect of intersectoral competition.  The 
way in which this is denoted allows a comparison of the relative effects of inter- and 
intrasectoral competition.  If 112 =b , then the dampening effect on sector one of 
firms in sector two is the same as if they were in sector one.  If 112 >b , then firms in 
sector two inhibit growth in sector one more than they would if they belonged to 
sector one (conversely for 112 <b ). 
 
In the model for n sectors, the system becomes: 
 
.
)(
1
i
i
n
j jiji
ii XK
XbK
rX
∑
=
• −
=       (7) 
 
bij  is the competition coefficient, with bij =1 for all i=j.  This term reflects the 
competitive effect of sector j on sector i relative to the competition in sector i itself.   
 
Let there be three sectors in our model: agriculture ( X1), rural industry ( X 2) and state 
industry ( X3).  (Three sector models of the Chinese economy have been used 
elsewhere; eg., see Shi and others 1993, Putterman 1992.)  This model highlights 
intersectoral competition for resources whose supply is fixed.  The resources are 
assumed to be potentially mobile within China, but not internationally (with the 
implications of an open economy discussed later).  In particular, assume that all three 
sectors draw upon a fixed quantity of labor as a prime resource in their production.  
The emphasis on labor is important, given that China’s post-reform transfer of labor 
from traditional agriculture to rural industry has been described as the largest in 
recent world history (Kalirajan and Wang 1994:66). 
 
 
4   The growth of rural industry  
 
The intersectoral competition model can be used to investigate the conditions under 
which rural industry will emerge.  This emergence has been spectacular, with non-
state industrial output rising from 26.7 percent of total output in 1983 to 58.6 percent 
in 1993 (Wong 1995:19).  The mid-1980s boom in rural industrialisation shall be 
treated as a distinct new phenomenon (see Chang 1993:241), with only agriculture 
( X1) and state industry ( X3) assumed to exist before this period.  Again, the sectors 
are sustained on a one-dimensional continuum of labor quality.  The focus on labor 
links the emergence of this new phase of rural industrialisation to one of its intended 
goals (namely, the absorption of underemployed or displaced farm labor) and 
facilitates discussion of rural structural transformation, a process in which labor 
transfer is a major component.  
 
Let agriculture and state industry initially be at their equilibrium sizes in the 
approximate absence of rural industry.  As rural industry just begins to be established 
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in very low numbers, X X1 1 2= ( ) , X X3 3 2= ( )  and X2 0≈ , where X1 2( ) and X3 2( ) are 
the equilibrium values of the sectors when rural enterprises are rare.  Growth in rural 
industry ( )X 2  at these points requires that dX dt2 0/ > . 
 
Assume that the intersectoral competition coefficients are identical and that the 
interactions of rural industry with agriculture and with state industry are the same.  
For the purposes of this section, let the intersectoral competition coefficients between 
adjacent sectors on the resource axis be b d( )  and that between agriculture and state 
industry be b d( )2 , where d is the average difference between the sectors in terms of 
the type of resource used.     
 
A result from Roughgarden (1974:165) forms the basis of the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1.   The condition for the successful entry of rural industry into the 
two-sector economy is: 
 
01
)((
)2(
2
)31 >+
+
−
K
KKdb
db .         (8) 
 
Proof.   The condition for X2  to be able to grow when rare is provided by 
Roughgarden (1979:543): 
 
     0)()( )2(3
)2(
12 >−− XdbXdbK . 
 
Rural industry can only emerge if sufficient resources allow it to grow; ie., if and 
only if the carrying capacity of rural industry exceeds the combined inhibitory effects 
of the incumbent sectors. 
 
Xi
j( )  represents the equilibrium size of sector Xi  in the absence of sector X j .  That 
is: 
 
     2
31)2(
1 )2(1
)2(
db
KdbK
X
−
−
= ,         2
13)2(
3 )2(1
)2(
db
KdbK
X
−
−
= . 
 
Substituting these equilibrium values into the growth expression above gives 
Proposition 1. 
  
 
Competition against rural industry by the incumbent sectors is reflected in )(db− .  It 
is difficult to determine how strong these competition effects are.  Distinct resource 
niches appear to exist for each sector, with agricultural workers being of lower 
quality than those in rural enterprises, who in turn are less skilled than state industrial 
workers.  The presence of these niches tends to reduce the strength of intersectoral 
competition for labor resources. 
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An important factor in the growth of rural industry relates to the expression 
( ) /K K K1 3 2+ .  The greater the amount of resources available to rural industry 
relative to the other sectors, the more likely is a successful entry into the economy.  
This was the case in the mid-1980s, when farm labor displacement due to 
agricultural productivity gains, together with unfavorable relative prices for 
agriculture and restrictions on rural-urban migration, left a large pool of surplus labor 
in the countryside.  State industry did not step in to absorb the labor because of 
rigidities in central planning; thus, the carrying capacity of rural industry rose.  
(Other important resource continua besides labor would include financial and 
physical inputs.  Financial resources for rural enterprises became more readily 
available as a result of fiscal contracting (Findlay, Watson and Wu 1993:9), the 
unwillingness of peasants to invest their savings in urban enterprises (Findlay and 
Watson 1992:66) and the mandating of rural credit cooperatives to provide credit for 
rural enterprises (Sicular 1992:360), while declining state control over the allocation 
of producer goods meant that rural enterprises could expand.  These results have 
been treated elsewhere; for example, see Anderson (1992)).   
 
 
5   Linkages between rural industry and agriculture 
 
The growth of rural industry described in the previous section relates to Phase I of 
structural transformation, with a one-way flow of resources from agriculture to rural 
industry.  As structural transformation proceeds, some intersectoral resource 
competition eventually makes way for mutually beneficial interaction.  This leads to 
Phase II, where the two sectors support one another in net terms.  Phase I overlaps 
with Phase II as agriculture and rural industry begin their economic integration.  
Rural industries have been important in helping agriculture to grow (Islam and Jin 
(1994:1644).  A mutualistic relationship develops as rural industry grows, generates 
more employment and raises off-farm incomes.  Part of the rising incomes are spent 
on or remitted to the agricultural sector (eg., see Islam and Jin (1994:1651-1655) for 
a discussion of financial flows from rural industry in support of agriculture).  Farm 
incomes rise and farmers are able to increase their expenditures on inputs, such as 
transport services and farm equipment, and on consumer goods, such as electrical 
appliances and housing, much of which is provided by rural industry.  The increased 
availability of consumer goods, for example, in turn provides more incentives for 
farmers to produce more in order to buy consumer goods.  (This is represented in the 
previous figure by the dotted line linking rural industrial output with agricultural 
supply.)  A virtuous circle emerges in which rural industry and agriculture expand in 
tandem.  Recent changes such as the greater freeing of agricultural prices contribute 
to these developments. 
 
The beneficial intersectoral relations are readily modelled.  Consider the mutually 
supportive agriculture-rural industry articulation: 
 
ijijiiiii XXaXarX )( +−=
•
.                             (9) 
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The notation has been simplified, with the intrasectoral competition coefficient 
denoted by iiii Kra /=  and the aij  terms representing the intersectoral interaction 
coefficients, such that 0>ija , i = 1 2, , i j≠ .  In the case at hand the interactions are 
beneficial, so that aij  shows the positive effect of a production unit from sector j on a 
unit from sector i.  The equilibria are given by: 
 
X
K K
i
i ij j
ij ji
∗
=
+
−
α
α α1
,                 (10) 
 
where α ij ij iia a= / .  It is easy to show that the Xi
∗ are strictly positive if 
r a r ai ji j ii> − .  Assuming both sectors can persist in the absence of interaction, the 
phase diagram for the stable mutualistic system is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1   Phase diagram 
 
X 2
X 1
X 2=0
X 1=0
K 1
K 2
E
.
.
0
    
 
 
The equilibrium point is E X X= ∗ ∗( , )1 2 .  The slope of the 01 =
•
X  isocline is a a11 12/  
and that of 02 =
•
X  is a a21 22/ .  The larger the beneficial interaction and the weaker 
the intrasectoral competition, the larger is the equilibrium size of the benefiting 
sector.  Note that X r a Ki i ii i
∗ > =/ ; ie., both sectors are larger than they would be in 
the absence of mutually beneficial interactions.   
 
The equilibrium E is stable if a a a a11 22 12 21> .  To determine the stability of E, let 
X X x1 1 1= +
∗  and X X x2 2 2= +
∗ , where x1 and x2  are small.  Linearise the system 
(1) in the neighbourhood of the fixed point, taking the first two terms of a Taylor 
series: 
 
 11
     x ax bx
•
= +1 1 2  
      x cx dx
•
= +2 1 2 . 
 
The coefficients are the partial derivatives evaluated at the fixed point.  For example, 
∂ ∂X X r a X a X
•
= − +1 1 1 11 1 12 22/ .  When evaluated at the fixed point, and recalling 
that r a X a X1 11 1 12 2= −  in equilibrium: 
 
     ∂∂
X
X
a X
•
∗
∗








= −
1
1
11 1 .      
 
Thus: 
 
     x
x
a X a X
a X a X
x
x
•
•
∗ ∗
∗ ∗







 =
−
−












1
2
11 1 12 1
21 2 22 2
1
2
. 
 
It is necessary to find eigenvalues λ satisfying: 
 
     
− −
− −
=
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
a X a X
a X a X
11 1 12 1
21 2 22 2
0
λ
λ
. 
 
⇒  )(4)()(2 212211
*
212112
2
222111222111
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
−+−−±+−= XXaaXXaaXaXaXaXaλ . 
 
The stability requirement hence becomes: 
 
     a a a a11 22 12 21> . 
 
Remark.  The positive intersectoral interactions, a12  and a21, are not stabilising.  
Stability derives from the self-regulatory effects, a11 and a22. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 2    An increase in intrasectoral competition in agriculture, an 
increase in the beneficial effect of agriculture on rural industry, a fall in 
intrasectoral competition in rural industry, or a fall in the beneficial effect of rural 
industry on agriculture is sufficient for structural transformation on the basis of 
agricultural-rural industrial articulation (Phase II). 
 
Proof.   Structural transformation implies that the ratio of agricultural to rural 
industrial output falls over time.  Define X  as the ratio of the equilibrium values of 
agriculture to rural industry: 
 
 12
X X
X
K K
K K
= =
+
+
∗
∗
1
2
1 12 2
2 21 1
α
α
.                (11) 
 
Recalling that the intrasectoral and intersectoral coefficients are strictly positive, as 
are the carrying capacities, ∂ ∂X a/ 11 0< , ∂ ∂X a/ 12 0> , ∂ ∂X a/ 22 0>  and 
∂ ∂X a/ 21 0< .  A fall in X  over time is consistent with increases in a11 and a21, and 
decreases in a12  and a22 over time.   
 
The changes are depicted in Figure 2, with both isoclines shifting upwards.  Note the 
change in the intercepts to reflect the new carrying capacities of each sector as 
intersectoral resource flows take place.  A locus of equilibrium points (AA) is drawn 
to indicate the fall in the agricultural-rural industrial output ratio.  
 
 
Figure 2   Structural transformation 
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Remark.    The intrasectoral competition coefficient in agriculture, a11, is likely to 
rise as fewer resources become available to agriculture with the resource flow to 
rural industry.  As rural industry purchases fewer agricultural products or as it 
changes the composition of its output to supply fewer inputs to agriculture, the 
positive feedback coefficient from rural industry to agriculture, a12 , is likely to fall.  
An increase in the carrying capacity of rural industry, K2 , decreases a22, the 
intrasectoral competition coefficient.  This could result from the flow of resources 
from agriculture to industry with the easing of restrictions on rural enterprises.  As 
agriculture expands in output value, the beneficial effect of agriculture on rural 
industry, a21, may rise as increasingly wealthier farmers purchase inputs and 
consumer goods from rural industry.  (Note that an increase in a21 is consistent with 
a rising a11, since agricultural output value could increase in absolute terms even 
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with a labor outflow if agricultural productivity rises enough.)  The effect of these 
changes is to decrease the per unit growth rate of the agricultural sector and raise that 
of rural industry, a change which is consistent with the structural transformation of 
the Chinese rural economy as agriculture decreases in sectoral importance (see Islam 
and Jin (1994:1647) for a description of the structural transformation of rural China 
between 1980-92).  
 
 
6   Competition with state industry 
 
State industry is now explicitly added to the sectoral analysis.  Assume that rural 
industry and agriculture continue to exhibit positive feedback, but that agriculture 
and state industry are connected by only one unidirectional link (from agriculture to 
industry).  This section focuses on the interactions between rural and state industry, 
where it is assumed that the two industrial sectors compete with one another in net 
terms.  The concept of intersectoral competition is now widened to include 
competition in output markets as well as for resources. 
 
Determining whether the relationship between rural and state industry is one of 
overall competition is clouded by a number of issues.  On the one hand, output 
produced by rural enterprises is sold to urban producers (Wu 1992:22), and in some 
areas state enterprises assist rural industry in a number of ways, including the 
provision of specialist training (Zweig 1992:425), technology, funds and marketing 
opportunities (Jefferson and Rawski 1995:133).  State enterprises in turn expand 
their sales by subcontracting or establishing rural subsidiaries to take advantage of 
cheaper labor, avoid problems of planning targets (Christiansen 1992:82) and gain 
access to vital inputs, including land, whose supply may be restricted in the state 
sector.     
 
On the other hand, the geographical distribution of rural industries and strong 
community identities associated with them reduce the extent of beneficial rural-state 
industrial linkages (Findlay and Watson 1992:76).  The two sectors also compete for 
resources such as energy and other inputs (Putterman 1992:480).  Raw material 
prices increase with the expansion of rural industry, inducing localities to retain 
resources in their own region to the detriment of state industry (Zweig 1992:431).  
The greater market prices received by some rural industries for their output have 
allowed them to outbid state enterprises in markets for inputs (Ody 1992:19).  J. Lin 
(1995:12) suggests that as investment demand rises in an economic boom, strong 
competition arises between state and non-state enterprises for credit, foreign 
exchange and raw materials.  When government regulations are not effectively 
enforced, bureaucrats and managers have incentives to divert resources from the state 
to the non-state enterprises under their control, where the rates of return are higher 
(Wong 1995:21, s.a. Woo, Hsueh, Shi and Zhang 1993:255). 
 
On the output side, rural and state industry compete for (monopoly) profits 
(Naughton, 1994:474; Naughton 1992) and in the supply of light industrial goods 
(Zweig 1992:419); such direct competitive effects have precipitated state 
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intervention in restricting the scope of rural industrial activity.  Singh and Jefferson 
suggest that 1982-90 provincial data show that the fall in state industry profits was 
greatest in provinces where rural industry grew the most rapidly (Singh and Jefferson 
1994:7), while national data suggest rapid rural industrial output growth at the 
expense of state industry (Jefferson and Rawski 1995:142).  Naughton (1994:479) 
also presents evidence of a consistent decline in the profits of state industry resulting 
from the rapid entry of and competition from rural industries (for a counter view, see 
Woo 1994:285). 
 
The intersectoral competitive effects arise indirectly as well.  Failure to reform state 
industry and come to grips with the soft budget constraint potentially imposes tax 
burdens (indirectly) on non-state sectors and perpetuates cycles of inflation and 
macroeconomic retrenchment, all of which inhibit the growth of rural industry (eg., 
see Islam (1991)).  In 1993, industrial investment increased by 71 percent; to the 
extent that state industry accounted for 62 percent of these investments, much 
investment credit failed to be channelled to rural industry (Singh and Jefferson 
1994:8).  In sum, then, it is assumed that rural and state industry are net competitors.     
 
The interrelationships between the three sectors can be modelled in terms of the 
familiar linear growth equations: 
 
     X r a X a X a X X1 1 11 1 12 2 13 3 1
•
= − + +( )             
     232322212122 )( XXaXaXarX −−+=
•
                     (12) 
     333323213133 )( XXaXaXarX −−+=
•
. 
 
As reflected in the signs of the coefficients, aij (i,j=1,2,3), the system (12) models 
beneficial interactions between agriculture and rural industry and between agriculture 
and state industry, while rural and state industry compete with one another. 
 
The agriculture-rural industry and rural industry-state industry interactions have 
already been discussed, while the positive links between agriculture and state 
industry are well-known, at least in terms of the flow from agriculture to state 
industry.  These resource flows were pronounced during China’s period of heavy 
industrial development.  With the current emphasis on a socialist market economy, 
agriculture can again be expected to contribute to state industrial growth.  For 
example, agriculture provides raw materials and foodstuffs to state industry.  All 
other things being equal, as grain output increases, the price of food in the cities 
tends to fall, putting downward pressure on wages in state industry.  The reverse 
flow, from state industry to agriculture is more difficult to determine.  Naughton 
(1992:18) mentions the flow of financial resources from state industry in support of 
agriculture, for example.  On the other hand, the econometric evidence from Yao 
(1994) finds no causal supportive link from state industry to agriculture, although he 
finds unidirectional causality from agriculture to state industry; Chowdhury and 
Chowdhury (1993) also provide partial support of this view.  
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The system (12) may now be used to derive the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3   Given the system (12), state industry is more likely to decline the 
higher the intrinsic growth rate of rural industry ( )r2  relative to that of state industry 
( )r3 , the lower the intrasectoral competition in rural industry ( )a22 , the higher the 
intersectoral competition from rural industry on state industry ( )a32 , and the higher 
the beneficial impact of agriculture on rural industry ( )a21  relative to agriculture's 
impact on state industry (a31). 
 
Remark.   The coefficient a32 is likely to be high given the intense rivalry between 
the two sectors, while a22 is probably relatively low due to the large flow of 
resources to rural industry, which increases rural industry's carrying capacity. 
Coefficient a21 is likely to be relatively high as farmers purchase the producer and 
consumer goods offered by rural enterprises.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates time paths of X1, X2 and X3 based on parameters related to 
Proposition 3.  
 
 
Figure 3   Simulated time paths 
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Proposition 3 presents the Chinese leadership with a dilemma.  A growing and 
prospering rural industrial sector puts competitive pressure on state industry.  State 
industry faces the prospect of a decline, with the attendant urban unrest and 
"betrayal" of proletarian interests high on the leadership's mind.  Support of the 
urban sector may be a true test of the Party leadership's commitment to socialism 
(Keidel 1992:130), social justice (Chou and Xu 1993:213) and job security 
(Putterman 1992:479), and state industry serves as an instrument of state power.  
Yuan Mu has recently claimed that state-owned enterprises “still represent our 
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country’s general economic power and are the chief source of the state budget and 
the main force for social stability” (Cottrell 1995:16).  Over 100m workers are 
employed in the state owned enterprises, and the enterprises themselves fulfil a 
welfare function by providing their workers and families with housing, medical 
benefits, education and pensions.  For a variety of reasons, then, the Party has been 
reluctant to allow state industry to suffer from the growth of the rural industrial 
sector.  (Although the desire to protect state industry is presented here as a non-
economic objective, economic considerations might also be considered, especially 
with regard to important areas such as energy provision by state industries.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that approximately one-third of state enterprises are 
estimated to be making explicit losses and one-third implicit losses (J. Lin 1995:11), 
non-economic objectives must account for some of the leadership's aversion to a 
decline in state industry.) 
 
The other side of the dilemma is that rural industry is a very dynamic and important 
sector in China's modernisation drive in terms of output, employment and tax 
revenues (rural industries have supplied over fifty percent of new state taxes since 
1980 (Zweig 1992:422), although the ability of the state to tax rural industry is 
currently less clear).  The suppression of rural industry in 1989 by the then dominant 
planning faction of the Party leadership and the back peddling from this policy in 
1990 highlight the anxiety that this dilemma has caused.  Either the social objective 
of protecting an inefficient state sector must be downgraded or rural industry must 
face the potential for further suppression by the state.        
 
 
7   Suppression of rural industry 
 
In seeking to avoid widespread unemployment and urban unrest, the leadership has 
demonstrated sufficient political resolve to retrench rural industry; in fact this was 
one of the goals of the 1989 austerity program (Sicular 1992:362, Putterman 
1992:480), although state industry also suffered as a result.  Two million rural 
enterprises were closed or taken over by other firms (Zweig 1992:422).  The state has 
implemented a raft of policies to restrict rural industries directly or to place them at a 
competitive disadvantage versus state industry.  Non-state enterprises have been the 
victims of forced plant closures, taxes and other financial pressures.  The state has 
been able to stop rural enterprises from withdrawing their own funds from the bank 
and has bankrupted them by having banks call in all outstanding loans (Zweig 
1992:427).  Conversely, state industries have been favoured by subsidised inputs, 
including capital, raw materials and energy, soft budget constraints and purchases of 
stocks unable to be sold on the market (Jefferson and Rawski 1992:55).    
 
This section seeks to show that such a strategy has the potential to harm state 
industry: given the positive feedback between rural industry and agriculture, the 
restrictions placed on rural enterprises hurt agriculture, which in turn indirectly hurts 
state industry, given the mutualism between state industry and agriculture.   
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In the following model, the size of the state industrial sector is fixed and the focus is 
solely on the mutualistic relationship between agriculture and rural industry.  The 
model of agricultural and rural industrial growth is given in the generalised form: 
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β  is a measure of government suppression of rural industry, with higher values of 
β  reflecting increasing suppression.   
 
The effect of a change in β  on the equilibrium values of X1 and X 2 is given in the 
following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 4     Let the model of agriculture and rural industry be given by 
(13), in which the derivatives satisfy: 
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for all β , then ),( 21 ββ XX  is a stable equilibrium of the dynamical system (13).  
Further, both β1X  and 
β
2X  are decreasing functions of β . 
 
Proof.     As noted in an earlier stability condition, the intersection point of the curves 
01 =h , 02 =h  is a stable equilibrium point of the dynamic system if: 
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As β  varies, these stable equilibrium points ),( 21 ββ XX  vary and are functions of β .  
Differentiate the system 01 =h , 02 =h  with respect to β : 
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This is a linear system which may be solved for :, 21 ∂β
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Given the assumptions on the signs of the derivatives, including that: 
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Thus, assuming a mutualistic relationship between agriculture and rural industry, and 
intrasectoral competition in both, it follows that suppression of rural industry by the 
government is damaging.  The effect of the suppression is to lower both rural 
industrial and agricultural output. 
 
Remark.     All other things being equal, the decline in agriculture in turn reduces the 
size of the state industrial sector, due to the positive linkage effects between the two 
sectors.  On the other hand, the suppression of rural industry releases resources to 
state industry, increases state industry's carrying capacity and, all other things being 
equal, raises the growth rate of state industry.  Thus, whether the policy of protecting 
state industry by suppressing rural enterprises harms state industry overall depends 
on the relative sizes of the two opposing effects.  
 
A corollary of Proposition 4 is given in the following proposition, such that 
decreases in rural industrial and agricultural output may inhibit the structural 
transformation of the rural economy. 
 
PROPOSITION 5     Consider the system (13) and the assumptions concerning the 
signs of the derivatives.  Let ( , )X Xe e1 2  represent the stable equilibrium when 0=β .  
Assuming that ee XX 21 >  and that 0/ 11 <Xh ∂∂ , 0/ 21 >Xh ∂∂ , then for 0>β :  
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That is, government suppression of rural industry leads to a rise in the ratio of 
agriculture to rural industry. 
 
Proof.     All equilibria ),( 21
ββ XX  lie on the curve 0),( 211 =XXh .  This equation 
implicitly defines X1 as a function of X 2.  The derivative 21 / XX ∂∂  on this curve 
may be computed as follows.  Differentiating with respect to X 2 and rearranging: 
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Note the assumptions needed in this proof.  The proof assumes that the initial size of 
agriculture is higher than that of rural industry.  This is the case for China, as it is for 
many other developing economies, especially if we consider the total number of 
workers in each sector.  The assumption that: 
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demands that the positive impact of rural industry on agriculture be lower than the 
effects of intrasectoral competition in agriculture.    
 
Proposition 5 has important implications for the growth of the rural sector as a 
whole.  Assume that structural transformation arising from an initial intersectoral 
disequilibrium increases economic growth.  The increase results from the 
reallocation of inputs from less productive to more productive sectors of the 
economy (B. Lin 1995b:2; s.a. Putterman 1992:467 for a related view).  That is, 
given an initial intersectoral disequilibrium where the marginal product of a resource 
is lower in one sector than another, the reallocation of resources to the intersectoral 
equilibrium maximises aggregate output. 
 
This could correspond, for example, to the rural situation in the mid-1980s as 
resources shifted from agriculture to rural industry in response to the initial 
disequilibrium (excess agricultural labor supply) and subsequent rural economic 
liberalisation.  An impact of the HRS was to save farm labor, which was then 
released to more productive uses in rural industry.  Woo and others provide evidence 
that by 1986 the per capita output of rural industries was nearly five times as great as 
that of agriculture, leading them to conclude that raising the share of non-agriculture 
in total rural labor should have increased the rural social output value (Woo, Hsueh, 
Shi and Zhang 1993:244).  
 
(Note that these authors seem to be talking about average revenue product - their 
point is clouded by the artificially suppressed price of farm products, for example, 
which also contributed to the structural transformation of the rural economy and 
reallocation of labor.  If agricultural price suppression were the only cause of the 
reallocation, it would by no means be clear that the resulting structural 
transformation would be optimal, especially if the agricultural output were valued at 
its higher, shadow price (eg., see Putterman 1992:480).) 
 
If Proposition 5 and the assumption that structural transformation contributes to 
aggregate economic growth hold, it follows that the suppression of rural industry 
must decrease the growth rate of the rural sector overall.  (In our three-sector model, 
we define the rural sector to be the sum of the rural industrial and agricultural 
sectors.)  The direct impact is that rural industrial output falls and drags down 
agricultural output, given the complementary linkages between the two sectors.  This 
effect is reinforced by the reversal of the path of structural transformation, as the 
number of agricultural to rural industrial firms rises. 
 
 
8   Policy implications 
 
The suppression of rural industry to protect state industry has two adverse 
consequences: state industry faces the possibility of being harmed indirectly through 
the rural industry-agriculture-state industry linkages, and the structural 
transformation of the rural economy is impeded.  The harm done to rural industry 
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may be reduced by the selective targeting of individual rural enterprises to be 
discriminated against, as opposed to a general sector-wide retrenchment.  For 
example, rural enterprises with weak or non-existent linkages with agriculture could 
be targeted for close-down.  The "39 Points" proposed at the 5th Plenum in 
November 1989 also suggested that product lines be shifted away from those of state 
industry and that rural enterprises be restricted to processing local materials (Zweig 
1992:422).  
 
Despite such policies, other aspects of the intersectoral competition problem remain 
difficult to resolve.  There are resources which are used by almost all rural 
enterprises.  Intersectoral competition exists for energy and transport (Findlay, 
Watson and Wu 1994b:15).  Shifts in product line are not likely to have a large 
impact on total use of such resources by a sector.  The shifting of product lines 
entails producer and consumer welfare costs, as rural producers move against 
comparative advantage and market demand.  Most importantly, the suppressing of 
rural industry diverts attention from the area most in need of overhaul - the 
inefficient state sector.  A long term solution to the problem involves state sector 
industrial reform and greater privatisation.  As Keidel suggests, in the absence of 
urban labor and management reforms, inefficient state enterprises will "hold the 
much more competitive non-state economy at bay by means of a hated taxing 
authority, restrictions on the scope of the non-state economy, and inflationary state 
finances" (Keidel 1992:121).   
 
The impetus for these changes comes from competition with rural enterprises 
(Rawski 1993:4).  Singh and Jefferson suggest that the growth of the non-state sector 
(ie., town and village enterprises) has led state industry to increase its productivity: 
"For every 10 percent increase in the non-state sector's share of industrial output, 
productivity in state industry - depending on the initial level of productivity - has 
risen by an average of 2.5 to 4.0 percent" (Singh and Jefferson 1994:7; see also 
Ratha, Singh and Xiao 1994).  In terms of the state industry growth model in 
equation (6), these intersectoral competitive pressures raise the carrying capacity of 
state industry and therefore its growth rate.  Removing the obligation of state 
enterprises to provide social services for its workers, greater input and output market 
flexibility, and the imposition of financial responsibility and accountability, would 
contribute significantly to easing the current problems of state industry.   
 
To the extent that intersectoral competition is encountered in output markets, this 
competition might be reduced by redirecting sales to external markets.  In this regard, 
the three-sector model of (12) implicitly incorporates the international trade sector as 
a vent for reduced intersectoral competition, since the competition coefficients (for 
outputs, at least) tend to decline with the introduction of new, overseas outlets for the 
outputs of state and rural industries.  Rural industries, for example, have played an 
active role in this area in becoming an important vehicle for China’s export-led 
growth (Lee 1994:190).            
 
In the longer term, an increase in export markets for rural industrial output can 
contribute indirectly to the growth of state industry.  Rural industry provides foreign 
exchange, with which more resources and technology may be imported to aid state 
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industry.  The short-run “zero-sum” scenario of rural-state industrial competition 
may partially give way to positive impacts provided by rural industry.  As Rozelle 
(1994:385) suggests, policies that slow down rural industry impair the growth of the 
Chinese economy as a whole.   
 
The growth of rural industry may even facilitate the transition to a privatized urban 
industrial sector.  State industrial sector reform becomes more tenable politically 
when redundant state workers are able to find alternative employment.  Given that 
the required educational levels of the workforce in rural enterprises are substantially 
above those in agriculture and are only slightly below the average levels in the state 
industrial sector (Wu 1994:132), an expansion of rural industry may be a source of 
labor absorption as state industry is reformed and urban workers are displaced.  
Competitive pressure from state industry obliges rural enterprises to increase capital 
accumulation and technology (Findlay, Watson and Wu 1993:16), so that rural 
enterprises are likely to gain from the urban-rural migration of technically-trained 
urban workers.        
 
 
9   Conclusions 
 
The models used in this and the preceding paper have attempted to characterize 
important elements of intersectoral interaction in the Chinese economy and highlight 
the implications of major policy interventions.  The analysis began by deriving the 
conditions under which rural industry might emerge and occupy a resource niche 
between agriculture and state industry.  With growth in rural industry, mutually 
supportive linkages with agriculture could develop, with the size of both sectors 
increasing relative to that in the absence of supportive linkages.  It was shown that 
under certain conditions rural industry could grow more rapidly over time than 
agriculture, resulting in the structural transformation of the rural sector. 
 
The growth of rural industry had potentially adverse implications for state industry 
due to intersectoral competition for resources and product markets; as a result, state 
industry could even decline.  The Chinese leadership would then face an unpalatable 
choice of either suppressing rural industry to protect state industry or compromising 
the social and political objective of protecting the urban proletariat.  The choice 
reflects the problems associated with meshing multiple objectives, ie., protecting 
state industry coupled with the desire to make greater use of the market, including 
the forging of intersectoral links, on efficiency grounds.  The suppression of rural 
industry and the protection of the state industrial sector could fail to achieve the twin 
objectives.  Market outcomes, including structural transformation of the rural 
economy, could be compromised by a decline in the growth rates of agriculture and 
rural industry, and the protection of state industry might be undermined by the 
indirect adverse effects arising from the suppression of rural industry.   
 
Depending on the magnitude of the relevant impacts, intervention to protect state 
industry may or may not be optimal; if the costs were low over some range of 
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intervention, some protection might be desirable, given the objectives of the Party 
leadership.   
 
These issues suggest that quantification of the trade-offs, perhaps with the aid of 
input-output or CGE models, may well be an important line of future research, 
especially if the prospects of thorough state sector reform remain as bleak as some 
have suggested (eg., J. Lin 1995:14) and if China wishes to extend its market 
reforms. 
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